



Remarks by

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***C-IED Beyond 2014: The Enduring Global IED
Threat Requires Enduring Capabilities***

**As delivered at
Permanent Session, NATO Military Committee**

December 12, 2011

Good afternoon.

Thank you Brigadier General Johnson for the kind introduction. Chairman [Lt. General Walter E.] Gaskin, Members of the Military Committee, I would like to thank you for inviting General Lilland and me to address you today. I am honored to be here and grateful for the opportunity to discuss the global threat posed by IEDs and our common need for enduring counter-IED capabilities.

Also, I would like to commend NATO ACT, specifically, General Abrial and General Lilland for their leadership and dedication to NATO's counter-IED efforts. And to the entire Alliance and ISAF contributing nations — our collective contributions have been critical and we've made significant progress in addressing the IED threat, but, as we look to the future, it is imperative that we do not lose momentum.

The IED, and the networks that employ them, will confront us as a threat, operationally and at home, long after our forces transition their current mission in Afghanistan. IEDs are the weapon of choice for our adversaries because they are cheap, readily available — largely “off the shelf” — easy to construct, lethal and accurate. In Afghanistan, these devices are the greatest source of casualties — with more than 1,500 IED events per month.

As General John Allen, commander of ISAF stated bluntly, this is a “very tough mission against an intelligent, resourceful and resilient enemy with patience and little regard for human life.” As we have seen, the insurgency is relying more frequently on IEDs and other, more high profile attacks. While not unexpected, these attacks are concerning because they show the adaptability of the insurgents and the powerful psychological effects on the Afghan people and on public sentiment in ISAF contributing nations — creating the appearance of increased violence and insecurity, even when the opposite is increasingly true.

[Slide 2: Global Threat Map]

But the IED threat continues to expand well beyond Afghanistan and is, in my view, truly a global threat. As you know, IEDs have been employed with devastating effects around the world with more than 600 IED attacks occurring outside of Iraq and Afghanistan on a monthly basis. From January to November 2011, [outside of Iraq and Afghanistan] there were 6,832 global IED events occurring in 111 countries, executed by more than 40 regional and transnational threat networks.

IED's have been used as a strategic weapon in a variety of situations including:

- Conflict and post-conflict environments [Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine];
- Illicit drug operations [Mexico, Columbia and Peru];
- Insurgencies [Chechnya, Russia, Nigeria, and Northern Ireland];
- Political violence [Kenya, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast];
- Religious crises [India, Pakistan and Nigeria];
- Ethnic conflicts [Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Serbia];
- And other acts of terrorism [United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Norway and France]

— All aimed at causing casualties, creating the perception of insecurity, and influencing the will of our nations.

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[Slide 3: Threat Continuum]

The IED is the weapon of choice for the overlapping consortium of networks that operate along the entire threat continuum — criminal, insurgent and terrorist alike. Though usually

addressed in a regional context, the threat is much more complex and transnational in nature, representing layers of interdependent, inter-connected global networks and support systems.

Nowhere is the convergence of transnational threats more apparent than in Afghanistan.

In the networks that support, supply, and employ IEDs in Afghanistan we see:

- The nexus of narcotic, criminal, insurgent, and terrorist networks;
- Supported by the easy flow of dual-use components;
- Passed through legitimate businesses;
- Composed of locally and readily available explosive materials;
- Executed by a generation of combat experienced IED makers and facilitators — all interacting and operating in a complex environment of tribal loyalties and endemic corruption.

These threat organizations are largely seamless, overlapping and not confined by geographical or jurisdictional boundaries. These threat networks are a virus that breeds and flourishes in a climate of instability.

Globalization, the internet, and social media have extended the transnational reach of these organizations, allowing threat networks to easily spread IED technology. The ubiquitous nature of IED materials, their low cost, and the potential for strategic impact, guarantee the IED will remain a threat and main casualty-producing weapon for decades to come. I believe “The IED is the artillery of the 21st century.”

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[Slide 4: C4ISR]

Recently, we have seen the tactics and techniques used by insurgents in Afghanistan increase in sophistication and proliferate throughout the region. The interaction of these networked organizations is enabled by the latest information technologies including the internet,

social media websites, web-based video conferencing and other virtual applications that provide a platform for recruiting, technical exchanges, training, planning, funding and social interaction. Their “centers of excellence” are all virtual, flat and unencumbered.

Today’s IEDs are relatively simple “low tech” devices which routinely use command wire, victim operated, or radio-controlled triggers. As you know, many readily available components such as circuit boards, cell phones and simple electronic transmitters and receivers have legitimate commercial uses, but are easily and increasingly adapted into IEDs.

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[Slide 5: HME]

Homemade explosives — also referred to as HME — are often composed of fertilizers that are ubiquitous, easy to transport, and readily converted into explosives. We see this threat first hand in Afghanistan, where more than 80 percent of the IEDs used against NATO/ISAF forces are calcium ammonium nitrate-based HME. This fertilizer and other dual-use components present a strategic advantage to our enemies and a security challenge to all of us.

For example, one bag of calcium ammonium nitrate costs \$31 U.S. dollars which produces six [6] to eight [8] IEDs. We have invested billions of dollars to combat a weapon — this HME-based IED — that costs the enemy only hundreds of dollars to make. The cost differential is astounding, and one we cannot sustain.

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[Slide 6: Future Device]

In the future, devices will adopt more sophisticated technology — limited only by one’s imagination. Future bomb makers will incorporate such enhancements as ultra-thin and flexible electronics; advanced communications mechanisms such as blue-tooth, WiFi, and broadband; optical initiators; and highly energetic and molecular materials.

In addition to more sophisticated technology, threat networks will develop enhanced IED concealment techniques and may even combine IED use with concurrent cyber attacks. The likelihood of new and developing technology being applied to IEDs in the future is certain — and troubling. Threat networks will take advantage of all available “off the shelf” technology — making devices more lethal and harder to detect and defeat. We must be ready to meet this challenge!

[Slide 6: OFF]

As new counter-IED techniques and tactics are employed by our forces, the enemy is adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures. Make no mistake, this is an arms race, but instead of years it takes only weeks to months for our adversaries to adjust and field new capabilities.

There is no single solution to defeat this threat. As General Lillard said, we need to integrate a range of efforts — supported by a whole-of-governments approach — “that are hierarchy flat and bureaucratically unencumbered” to neutralize threat networks and devices.

As we execute the drawdown in Afghanistan, we must ensure that neither budget pressures nor “war fatigue” cause us to lose our focus on the enduring and global IED threat and the networks that employ them.

While introducing the Smart Defence concept in February, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said it best, I quote, “In an age of austerity, we cannot spend more, but neither should we spend less. So the answer is to spend better — get better value for the money. To help nations preserve capabilities and deliver new ones means we must prioritize, we must specialize, and we must seek multinational solutions.” End quote.

The enduring and evolving nature of the global IED threat requires continuous and adequate resourcing over time. Consistent investment is essential to maintain the requisite

counter-IED expertise, processes, and organization focus, but in this fiscally constrained environment, we must coordinate our efforts and invest efficiently.

To have a decisive and lasting impact on the adversary's use of IEDs, our actions must focus on attacking threat networks through the fusion of information, analysis, and partner support. We must be agile, adaptive, innovative, persistent and relentless — but most importantly we must institutionalize the best counter-IED practices, while openly collaborating across our supporting communities of interest.

To defeat the threat, we must continually identify likely capability gaps, their potential solutions, and leverage the Alliance to develop common and interoperable responses to address these future challenges.

[Slide 7: Enduring Capabilities]

As we look to the future, and the requirement to sustain counter-IED efforts, I believe there are five overarching capabilities that need to endure for my nation, and apply to NATO as well.

First, we must maintain the ability to rapidly provide counter-IED material and non-materiel solutions in response to changes in the IED threat. We must maintain a higher level of institutional agility and leverage the capabilities of this Alliance.

To aid in rapid response, we should look across the Alliance and industry for already demonstrated technologies. For example, as dismounted operations increased in Afghanistan, so did severe pelvic injuries to our troops. Thanks to our United Kingdom partners, my organization —JIEDDO, was able to fund, and begin to deliver, protective outer and undergarments within only a couple of months.

By tapping into an already developed and proven technology, we were able to rapidly respond to an urgent need. This is a perfect example of the benefits of Smart Defence.

We must maintain this rapid acquisition capability in the future and share capabilities across the Alliance and with our partners.

The second capability that needs to endure is our ability to fuse operational information and intelligence, from all sources, in order to produce actionable intelligence — analytical products that meet the needs of our operational commanders and ensures security at home.

As General Lillard said earlier, “we must have an understanding of whom and what these networks look like from the strategic to tactical level.” This is accomplished through a robust and powerful network of partners with whom analytical tools, methodologies, and most importantly information and intelligence can be shared to identify, and then exploit, the vulnerabilities of threat networks.

This type of Defeat-the-Network capability is critical to our deployed warfighters and is something the Alliance should consider adding as a Smart Defence priority. NATO can build upon the infrastructure already in place at the Intelligence Fusion Center at Molesworth, United Kingdom and JIEDDO, my organization, stands ready to support NATO efforts to establish an enduring operational information and intelligence integration capability for the Alliance. We are all confronted by the same global set of networked enemies. So, we need to remain networked in our efforts to defeat them in the future.

Third, we must maintain our ability to train our forces. Counter-IED and Defeat-the-Network training must endure and be permanently integrated into our individual Service and Alliance training institutions and centers. As you heard earlier from General Lillard, NATO has made great progress in this area, but there is still work to be done.

We all know our best counter-IED weapon is a well-trained soldier. Of course we must share training approaches and collaborate with our allies to ensure uniformity across the joint and combined forces in preparation for future combat operations.

The NATO, Madrid-based, Counter-IED Center of Excellence is an organization with great potential to assist in maintaining the Alliance's counter-IED warfighting capabilities.

I am committed to providing JIEDDO assistance for the Center of Excellence as it executes its strategic growth plan.

Currently however, only 7 of NATO's 28 member states participate in the Madrid Center of Excellence. I would ask all NATO member states to consider joining the Steering Committee and assigning appropriate personnel for the Madrid Center.

We can provide the best counter-IED capabilities to the warfighter, but without the timely and relevant training component, the full capacity of equipment and tactics will never be realized. And the NATO COE in Madrid is central to maintaining our ability to develop and deliver realistic counter-IED training to the Alliance. I urge you to support it.

The fourth enduring capability we must maintain is our ability to conduct relevant and timely collection, analysis, and technical and forensic exploitation of current and emerging IED technologies through weapons technical intelligence.

We need to build upon capabilities such as the Counter-IED Theatre Exploitation Laboratory (TEL) in Afghanistan — a European Defence Agency initiative lead by the France and supported by Austria, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Poland. This multi-national collaborative effort provides an in-theater exploitation capability and is a great example of what can be accomplished when we pool and share our resources. This is Smart Defence! And this Alliance capability must endure.

Fifth, and finally, as I mentioned earlier, the enduring global IED threat requires a whole-of-governments approach. We must synchronize counter threat network capabilities and actions among National, Alliance, international and other counter-IED stakeholders. Only through common policies, collaborative planning, information sharing and cooperative capability development by all of our governments will we most effectively have a decisive effect on these threat networks.

These five essential enduring capabilities —

- **Rapid acquisition and fielding;**
- **Operations-intelligence-information fusion/Defeat-the Network Capability;**
- **Counter-IED training;**
- **Weapons technical intelligence;**
- **And, a whole-of-government(s) approach**

— are synergistic and provide a comprehensive response to a complex and dynamic threat. It takes an Alliance to defeat an Alliance.

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[Slide 8: Our Challenges —FINAL SLIDE]

Still looking to the future, and before closing, there are a couple questions that I believe we should collectively explore.

First — and the most critical — how do we institutionalize counter-IED capabilities within our military and government and Alliance structures? How do we develop common capabilities, standards, and training, and then fully integrate them into our National and NATO institutions? My greatest concern for NATO is the tendency for nations — including my own — constrained by diminishing resources —to allow hard-won counter-IED capabilities to attrite. We must not let this happen.

A great example of success is the evolution of the NATO Warfighting Standards, which over time have become increasingly common to our national warfighting doctrines, as Service schools and training courses in every NATO country encourage and facilitate student exchanges.

The continued development of a STANAG and other NATO Doctrine that General Lillard mentioned earlier, are all positive steps in developing common capabilities and standards to integrate into our institutions. But, we must do more – we **HAVE** to do more.

The second question, how do we successfully implement Smart Defence? Our resource constrained operating environment requires us to find efficiencies and synergies through multinational cooperation and standardization. JIEDDO stands ready to work with NATO and ISAF partners to implement Smart Defence — capitalizing on our counter-IED individual areas of expertise, to facilitate interoperability and preserve counter-IED capabilities moving forward.

Admiral Stravridus characterized the current level of counter-IED competency across all of NATO as having produced, I quote, a “notch generation.” This experienced, combat-tested, technologically advanced pool of NATO veterans possesses a unique, unprecedented level of talent forged during the last 10 years of operational experience. We must not lose this competency.

This new approach to defense spending allows us to pool our resources, share capabilities, prioritize defense needs and coordinate our activities — ensuring the Alliance’s ability to address any future IED threat. Identifying solutions to the questions I outlined today:

- How do we institutionalize common capabilities, standards, and training; and
- How do we successfully implement Smart Defence

— finding solutions to these questions will ensure we have the right tools in place to meet any future IED threat and to defeat the threat networks that employ them.

As you know, JIEDDO is hosting a NATO sponsored Senior Leader Seminar February 28 and 29, next year, in Washington, DC, to familiarize partner nations with JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center, or COIC, capabilities. Our intent is for NATO leaders to gain an understanding of the integrated and multi-disciplinary process of "Attacking the Networks" including operations, intelligence, weapons technical intelligence, EOD, military engineering and JIEDDO COIC capabilities accessible through CENTRIX ISAF. I hope that each of your countries will be represented at this seminar.

In closing, if you leave here today with only one take-away — it is that the IED threat is global and it is enduring. We can't take our eye off of this threat as we drawdown in Afghanistan. We must continue to coordinate our efforts and maintain the hard-earned counter-IED experience we have acquired during these last 10 difficult years by supporting the NATO Counter-IED Action Plan, Smart Defence, NATO Centers of Excellence and ACT's development of the Counter-IED Campaign Plan.

We cannot allow hard-won counter-IED capabilities to attrite in this environment constrained by diminishing resources. While no one can predict for certain what the future threat environment will look like — I can confidently say that the IED will be a focal point in any future operations.

We are never going to stop all IEDs; however, through initiatives like Smart Defence we will ensure greater security, for less money and ultimately continue to produce decisive effects on future battlefields and security at home. I look forward to our continued close cooperation in the future. I appreciate your time and attention this afternoon.

Thank you.